The block cipher ARIA has been threatened by sidechannel analysis, and much research on countermeasures of this attack has also been produced. However, studies on countermeasures of ARIA are focused on software implementation, and there are no reports about hardware designs and their performance evaluation. Therefore, this article presents an advanced masking algorithm which is strong against second-order differential power analysis (SODPA) and implements a secure ARIA hardware. As there is no comparable report, the proposed masking algorithm used in our hardware module is evaluated using a comparison result of software implementations. Furthermore, we implement the proposed algorithm in three types of hardware architectures and compare them. The smallest module is 10,740 gates in size and consumes an average of 47.47 μW in power consumption. Finally, we make ASIC chips with the proposed design, and then perform security verification. As a result, the proposed module is small, energy efficient, and secure against SODPA.
I. Introduction
Related Works
Side-channel analysis reveals secret values using physical information like operation times, electromagnetic radiation, and power consumption from cryptographic devices. Since Kocher introduced differential power analysis (DPA) in 1998 [1] , much research about side-channel analysis and its countermeasures has been produced. Side-channel analysis attacks cryptosystems using the relationship between intermediate values in crypto devices and physical information measured from the devices. In other words, the attacks can be defended by breaking this relationship. The DPA attack, one of the most powerful side-channel analysis methods, can also be prevented by breaking correlation between intermediate values and measured power signals using masking or hiding methods [2] .
Masking, one of the DPA countermeasures, inserts random values into the intermediate values in cipher calculations to break correlation, and the intermediate values in the crypto system are ambiguously changed. Masking methods efficiently prevent DPA attacks, but they are insecure against second-order DPA (SODPA) attacks [3] . Therefore, many researchers are looking into ways to defend against SODPA by applying additional algorithms like the shuffling method.
The block cipher ARIA has also been threatened by DPA attacks, and studies on the masking are underway to prevent such dangers. As masking algorithms can avoid only first-order DPA, the shuffling method is generally used to inhibit the SODPA attacks. However, it is hard to apply a masking algorithm including a shuffling method for the block cipher ARIA in computationally limited environments because the ARIA algorithm is large and slow compared with other block ciphers like AES. Moreover, most research on ARIA countermeasures focus on software implementation. Thus, we propose a new ARIA masking algorithm appropriate for hardware designs and implement our proposed algorithm in ASIC chip.
Contributions
We present two developments in this article. First, we introduce an advanced ARIA masking algorithm named adaptive random masking. The other development is that we efficiently implement the above algorithm to various hardware architectures and compare them. Moreover, we implement our design in an ASIC chip and verify its security.
A. Adaptive Random Masking Algorithm
Adaptive random masking basically uses different random numbers for each input block in a round, and this work can defend the SODPA without additional protection like S-box shuffling. Of course, previous masking algorithms can change their masks for every block when the algorithms calculate masking S-boxes for different masks, but this method is very inefficient. Our proposed method, however, is designed such that different random masks are utilized in every block efficiently in hardware implementation.
B. Performance Evaluation of Proposed Algorithm
Because there is no comparable research about hardware implementation of ARIA masking, it is difficult to directly evaluate the proposed masking algorithm. Thus, we implement the adaptive random masking algorithm in software at first, and then we compare the proposed algorithm with other masking algorithms using the implementation result.
C. Hardware Implementation and Comparison
We implement the adaptive random masking algorithm to hardware, and show it is efficient for small-area and low-power devices. Because there are no comparable reports about masked ARIA hardware implementations, we implement our algorithm on three types of design and compare the performance themselves. As the result, the 8/16-bit architecture is the smallest and has approximately 7.1% areal overhead. Moreover, the power consumption in the 8/16-bit module has a 35.8% increment over the original ARIA module.
D. Security Evaluation
We experimentally evaluate the security of the proposed algorithm and its implementations. We program the software countermeasure into an 8-bit microcontroller and perform the SODPA resistant test. In the case of a hardware module, we evaluate the security using ASIC chips. In this way, we can experimentally verify that the adaptive random making method and its implementation are secure.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We describe the block cipher ARIA and the previous studies about ARIA masking algorithms in section II. We introduce the adaptive random masking method in section III. In section IV, we evaluate the efficiency of the proposed algorithm with the software implementation results. Section V describes hardware implementations for the proposed masking algorithm and their performance. Verification of security is presented in section VI, and our conclusions are given in section VII.
II. Previous Works
1. Block Cipher ARIA Block cipher ARIA, which is based on an involution SPN structure, encrypts and decrypts data in 128-bit blocks. ARIA can have a 128-bit, 192-bit, or 256-bit key size, and a corresponding number of round functions. A round operation in the ARIA procedure has a key addition, substitution layer, and diffusion layer. Round keys are composed by a combination of 512-bit expanded keys (W 0 , W 1 , W 2 , W 3 ). In addition, the expanded key is made from round functions [4], [5] .
The substitution layer of ARIA uses four S-boxes (S 1 , S 2 , S 1
), and S 1 -1 and S 2 -1 are the inverses of S 1 and S 2 . All the S-boxes in ARIA are defined over composite field GF (2 8 ) with the irreducible polynomial m(x) = x 8 + x 4 + x 3 + x + 1, and the polynomial is identically used in AES algorithm. Thus, S-boxes in the ARIA can be described as
, T ; therefore, the diffusion output can be denoted as O = C·I [7] .
Finally, the whole ARIA algorithm can be described as in algorithm 2, where AddRoundKey(state, w[ ]) = state ⊕ w[ ]. In addition, N b is denoted as the number of bytes and N r is the number of rounds in algorithm 1.
Side-Channel Analysis on ARIA and Its Countermeasures
Since side-channel analysis was introduced, many cryptosystems have been threatened by this attack, including ARIA. The weakness of the ARIA algorithm against side-channel analysis was presented in various studies [8] . Both DPA and fault injection attacks can be performed on ARIA [9] .
A. Previous Countermeasures for ARIA
The general masking algorithm and the algorithm using a masked inversion table are generally used as countermeasures for ARIA [10] . The general masking algorithm generates four masked S-boxes as shown in algorithm 2 for the masked substitution layer. This method requires 1,024 bytes of RAM and many times that to generate masked S-box tables, so it is inappropriate for hardware architecture. When the algorithm is implemented to software, total operation cycles for the general masking are about four times longer than original cipher's operation time, which is shown in Table 1 .
Masking with a masked inversion table is relatively efficient for small memory environments as the algorithm requires only 256 bytes of RAM and 256 bytes of ROM. However, this method is very slow for calculation. This method is ten times slower than the original ARIA operation cycles. Moreover, when we change random masks at a round or an input block, the whole operation time is slowed down tremendously as shown in Table 1 .
B. Motivation
Previous masking algorithms are inefficient for hardware design and embedded systems which have restrict resources.
Algorithm 2. Masked S-Boxes for general masking
Input: As the masking algorithms have low performance, many researchers are looking into ways to improve their efficiency.
One of the ways is to reduce the number of calculations in masking table generation [7] . Applying random masks to only the first and final rounds in the cipher is also considered a fast method. These modified algorithms, however, still have security problems related to the SODPA attack, and these methods are not considered for hardware architecture and its efficiency. Thus, we consider that the proposed masking algorithm can be efficiently implemented to hardware and demonstrate that the proposed masking algorithm is strong against the SODPA attack using different random masks.
III. Adaptive Random Masking Algorithm for ARIA
Since the ARIA algorithm uses four S-boxes at the substitution layer, four masked S-boxes should be defined and, in general, the masked S-box table should be computed and stored at every round. However, in our proposed masking algorithm, we use only one masked inversion table, and the masked S-boxes are computed at each round when the algorithm is implemented to software. Furthermore, the proposed masking uses different random masks for every input block to defend against SODPA. For the proposed masking method, the inversion table and affine transform tables (A, D, A • Choose r = (r 0 , r 1 ,…,r 15 ) (resp. r' = (r' 0 , r' 1 ,…,r' 15 )) be a 128-bit input (resp. output) masking random, where r i (resp. r' i ) is an 8-bit subblock of r (resp. r' ) for i = 0,…,15.
• Choose 8-bit random values r I and r' I .
• An initial masked inversion table MI is calculated with initial masks r I and r' I as shown in algorithm 3.
For each S-box, the proposed masked S-box, named the adaptive masked S-box, is defined as
for some i=0,…,15, where ,
for S 1 -box (resp. S 2 -box), and the i-th masked S-box input Therefore, we can consider the diffusion output with random numbers for the next round of operations. When the n-th round key is denoted as ek(n) and the n-th round random mask r' is defined as r'(n), the (n+1)th round key of the proposed masking algorithm is calculated as DiffusionLayer(r'(n))⊕ek(n+1).
IV. Proposed Masking Algorithm Evaluation with
Software Implementation
The implementation results of the previous studies on masking algorithms are focused on software. Because there are no comparable reports on the hardware implementation of masked ARIA, we evaluate the proposed adaptive random masking algorithm with software implementation. We implement the proposed algorithm to software and compare it with previous algorithms within operation speed, memory allocation for algorithm, and security.
Algorithm Optimization and Software Implementation
In general, the masking scheme makes masking S-box tables, but our proposed implementation scheme does not make masking S-box tables. The proposed algorithm generates masked inversion table and calculates the output of S-boxes every round. Therefore, the proposed algorithm can be implemented with only 256 bytes of ROM and 256 bytes of RAM. However, this implementation proved too slow in calculating affine transforms. As such, we changed from calculating affine transforms to using ROM tables. Also, we can improve operation speed by approximately 90%. Thus, our implementation needs 1,024 bytes of ROM for the affine transform tables, 256 bytes of ROM for an inversion table, and 256 bytes of RAM for a masked inversion table.
The proposed masking procedure is composed of the following three steps which are shown in the previous section. First of all, the masked inversion table is made from an inversion table and random masks. Second, the masked substitution layer is calculated at a round with input values and random masks. In this case, management for random numbers is needed because our substitution layer can be made using different random values for every input byte in a round operation to protect from SODPA. Finally, the diffusion layer is calculated with random values. As the diffusion layer output includes random values, the round keys which are used in next round operation are considered with the random masks.
Our proposed algorithm is fully implemented in the following three types:
• The first and final round masking method is the fastest way to mask. The method changes random numbers for every block, and the method has just 4% overhead compared to the original ARIA algorithm in clock time. This method has security problems, but it is just an example for fast operation for comparison to other method.
• The second method is implemented with full round masks.
The second method changes random masks for every block, but it uses the same random values which were used in the first round for all rounds. This method has approximately 11% overhead in clock time.
• Full round masking with different random values at every round method changes random masks in every block and every round. This method requires twice as much operation time as original ARIA, but this method offers high security.
All implementations are simulated by using CalmSHINE software, and the results are shown in Table 2 .
Algorithm Comparison with Software Implementation
Generally, the ARIA masking algorithm needs 1,024 bytes of RAM and 1,024 bytes of ROM to generate masking tables. In contrast, our proposed algorithm can be implemented with 256 
A. Proposed Algorithm Evaluation with Previous Algorithm Using a Masked Inversion and Affine Transforms
The operation speeds of previous algorithms are presented in Table 1 . From the survey, we can find that the previous algorithm composed with a masking inversion table and affine transforms is very slow in contrast with the proposed algorithm. As we do not implement the previous work [10] , the comparison is preceded using the relative times for operation in Table 2 . When we compare our proposal with the previous method, which uses different random masks for every block, the proposed masking method is extremely faster than the other shown in Table 2 . Moreover, not only can our proposal change random values for every block but, in contrast with the previous method, can also use different masks for every round.
B. Proposed Algorithm Evaluation with Previous Algorithms Using Masked S-Box Tables
It is hard to correctly compare operation times of the proposed algorithm with other masking algorithms which generate masked S-box tables because our implementation does not make masking tables. In this case, we can compare our algorithm using two methods.
First, we count operations. The proposed algorithm requires 832 table indexing and 1,664 XOR operations to generate a masked inversion table and calculate masked S-boxes. As such the proposed algorithm needs less table indexing but more XOR operations compared with the algorithm from [7] . As the count result shown in Table 3 is ambiguous to exactly compare the proposed algorithm and the others, we simulate the algorithms. When we use the CalmSHINE, which is a smart card software development toolkit to simulate the algorithms for comparison of operation clock cycles, 35,097 clocks are required for the generation of four masked S-boxes in general masking method. Our proposed implementation, however, needs 11,544 clock cycles for making a masked inversion table. Calculations for the substitution layer in a round require 1,024 clock cycles which is double the general masking algorithm and the algorithm in [7] 's calculation time.
We also simulate the implements using various development tools while considering a diverse range of embedded platforms. We organize the same algorithms for MSP430 and ATmega-128, which are widely used microcontrollers in various fields, and we can get similar result in terms of clock cycles. As a result, the proposed algorithm is secure against the SODPA and fast, even though the number of operation cycles for masking the substitution layer is greater than for other methods. The whole results are shown in Table 4 .
V. Adaptive Random Masking H/W Implementation
Although there is much research on the ARIA hardware modules which do not include masking and the related architectures [6] , [11] - [13] , there are no studies on comparison of efficiency and structures for masked ARIA hardware implementation. In this section, we describe the masked hardware architectures considering previous architectures, implement the proposed algorithm to hardware modules, and compare the designs.
Proposed Masking Hardware Architecture
Generally, the ARIA hardware is implemented to 128-bit, 32-bit, 16-bit, or 8-bit architectures, but there are no reports of masked ARIA hardware implementation. Therefore, we considered three types of designs to compare area efficiency, performance, and power consumption themselves. The implementations are considered using different random masks for every block in every round.
• The fundamental method uses a 128-bit structure. The 128-bit architecture has a 128-bit diffusion layer composed of 480 two-input XOR gates and processes all random masks at once. Therefore, the whole structure is composed with a 128-bit substitution layer as shown in Fig. 2 
(a).
• The diffusion layer is initially a 16×16 matrix, but it can be split into four 16×4 matrices. Because the matrix C in session 2 is an involution matrix, elements of C are described as c i,j = c 15-i,8+j . Thus, the second architecture can be made using a 32-bit architecture with a 32-bit diffusion layer and a 32-bit masking process as shown in Fig. 2 
(b).
• The architecture as shown in Fig. 2(c) has mixed structure composed of an 8-bit substitution layer and a 16-bit diffusion layer. The substitution layer has just a masked S-box composed by a masked inversion and an affine transform. In the diffusion layer, we can denote the diffusion layer input I n = (i n, 0 , i n, 1 , …, i n, 7 ) where {n | 0 ≤ n ≤ 15} because the element I n of input vector I is an 8-bit value. Furthermore, the array of the m-th bit selected from each input byte is defined as Î m = (i 0, m , i 1, m , …, i 15, m ), where {m | 0 ≤ m ≤ 7}. That is, the result value can be described as Ô m =C·Î m where {m | 0 ≤ m ≤ 7}.
Optimization for the Substitution Layer
Making a small S-box is very important because an S-box is large and spends much power in cryptographic devices. As masked S-boxes are composed by a masked inversion function and affine transforms, a small masked inversion module is important for an area efficient implementation. Because a multiplication requires more circuits than any other operation, the whole circuit size is shrunk by reducing multiplications [7] , [14] - [18] .
A masked inversion function is a combination of multiplications, squares, constant multiplications, and XORs. Although an arbitrary inversion has fewer multiplications, the whole module size is not always reduced. Moreover, the area efficiency can be changed by the base field. For example, the inversion of [7] is smaller than [17] over the composite field
), but the inversion of [7] is larger than [17] in the field GF ((2   2   ) 2 ). These kinds of results are shown in Table 5 which includes the number of transistors to compare module size exactly, and the proposed adaptive inversion is optimized based on previous studies.
The proposed masked S-box, named the adaptive masked S-box, is implemented with an optimized adaptive masked inversion, and the architecture is accomplished with the six steps shown in Fig. 3 . Fig. 3 . Adaptive masked S-box structure.
Step 1 Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Step 6 Masked inversion When the 8-bit input of the adaptive masked inversion function is defined as χ⊕r and the λ is the constant value, the first step output α⊕μ is calculated as
Step 1:
Implementation Results and Performance Evaluation
We implement three types of hardware using the proposed adaptive random masking algorithm. The adaptive masked inversion in the adaptive masked S-box requires approximately 4,116 transistors, and it can reduce about 1.2% of the whole size compared to the previous inversion architecture [7] . All designs are synthesized without random number generator modules by Synopsys with 0.25-μm CMOS standard-cell technology library, and the results are shown in Table 6 .
When we compare our 128-bit masked ARIA module to non-masked ARIA [6] , the proposed masking module has low throughput. However, the proposed architectures of 32-bit and 16-bit are more efficient within throughput as shown in Table 6 . Our non-masked ARIA, which is composed with the proposed 8/16-bit structure, is relatively larger than a previous work [12] . That is, the previous work [12] has latches for memory. It is hard to reduce the size of ARIA modules because of memories in fact. The memories composed with latches can reduce about 20% of the whole size. We performed a power simulation of our designs at 100 kHz 2.5 V using the synopsys power compiler as shown in Table 7 . Our implementation has random number generators to make masks, but the simulation was run without the random number generator. Finally, we produced our design to ASIC chips using 0.18-μm CMOS standard-cell technology library as shown in Fig. 4 and the security evaluation board for the ASIC chip as shown in Fig. 5 .
It is impossible to compare our outcomes accurately with previous works because there are no reports that compare area efficiency or the performance of masked ARIA hardware implementations. Therefore, we implement the proposed algorithm on various architectures and compare them. The result shows that the 8/16-bit architecture is small and has low power consumption, which makes it suitable for small devices like RFIDs or smart cards. However, our module is large and uses a great deal of power compared with the AES architecture [19] , but our module is not large considering that the original ARIA architecture is basically larger than the AES. When the non-masked ARIA module is implemented using the proposed 8/16-bit architecture, the equivalent gate count is 10,027 and the average power consumption at 100 kHz 2.5 V is 34.96 μW. Therefore, we consider that the overhead of our masking scheme has a 7.1% increment in area and 35.8% increment in power consumption. Thus, compared with other ARIA modules, not only is our design efficient but also safe against SODPA.
VI. Security Analysis
Theoretical Security Proof
When an arbitrary element x and a uniformly distributed element r which is independent of x in GF (2 n ) are given, the result of the addition and the result of multiplication between x and r are independent of x over the composite field GF(2 n ) [7] , [17] . Because our masking algorithm follows this theory, we can easily prove security of the proposed algorithm as seen in previous studies [7] , [17] .
Experimental Security Proof
We implemented our masking algorithm in software and hardware, and then experimentally verified the security for our system. We performed the SODPA resistant test using a second-order correlation power analysis (SOCPA) [3] , [20] . i) We implemented the general masking algorithm on an ATmega128 processor, and then performed the SOCPA. The result shown in Fig. 6 presents that the general masking method has security problems against the SOCPA attack. ii) We implemented the adaptive random masking algorithm on the same ATmega128 processor, performed a SOCPA experiment with the same conditions of the first test. The proposed masking algorithm is secure against SOCPA, and a result of the experiment is shown in Fig. 7 . iii) We performed the same experiment on an ASIC chip which includes the adaptive random masking algorithm. We made an evaluation board as shown in Fig. 5 and performed SOCPA on the board. From the experiment, we can verify that the masked ARIA hardware module is secure against SOCPA, and the result is shown in Fig. 8 .
VII. Conclusion
This article presented the secure hardware implementation and an advanced masking algorithm for block cipher ARIA. The proposed algorithm, the adaptive random masking algorithm, was verified using comparison results of software implementations, and we implemented it in hardware. As this paper is the first report of masked ARIA hardware implementation, we compared various hardware architectures. The proposed 8/16-bit module, which is the smallest of our work, uses only 47.47 μW at 100 kHz 2.5 V, and the overhead of the masking scheme is only a 7.1% increment in area and a 35.8% increment in power consumption compared to nonmasked ARIA module. Finally, we experimentally verified the security of the proposed algorithm, and results showed the proposed algorithm and implementations were secure against SODPA. Thus, we conclude that the proposed hardware and the adaptive random masking algorithm are appropriate for small devices like RFIDs or smart cards.
